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ant's objection, received accounting evidence sponsored
by plaintiffs using that procedure only. (Tr. 34, 11011). The Court rejected as a matter of law offers of
proof duly made by defendant designed to show:
1. The accounting procedure used by plaintiffs in
this case is not consistent with "the accounting method
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in
the years prior to 1965" as required by the Amended
Declaratory Judgment entered by the Court below in
the prior case.
2. The precise nature of "the accounting method
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in
the years prior to 1965" which was prescribed by the
Amended Declaratory Judgment of the Court below in
the prior case.
3. The fact that testimony, books and records were
available at the time of trial to compute "net profit rentals under the Fifty-Year Lease calculated by the accounting method approved by the Lessor and utilized by
the parties in the years prior to 1965" as prescribed by
the Amended Declaratory Judgment heretofore entered
by the Court below in the prior case and that plaintiffs'
computations and extrapolations were incompetent and
illegal.
bered from "1-130", when in fact the proceedings were held a
year earlier on November 14, 1973 and the pages of the transcript of which are separately numbered 1-40.
The pages of the transcript for the September, 1974 proceedings
will be referred to in the text herein as " [ T r . . . . . ] " and those
of the November, 1973 hearing will be specifically identified.
* • * : • . - .
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4. The amount of net profit rentals due plaintiffs
"under the Fifty-Year Lease calculated by the accounting method approved by Lessor and utilized by the
parties in the years prior to 1965" was substantially less
than those calculated by plaintiffs. (Tr. I l l , et seq.)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment of the
Trial Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case has its origin and, under the specific rulings of the Trial Judge, had its finality established by
the prior case between the same parties in the District
Court. That former case involved the interpretation and
application of some of the same lease agreement language which is here involved. We will, therefore, attempt to make a concise statement of the development,
processing and disposition of the pertinent issues leading to this appeal.
J.

Genesis of this Case:
a) Pertinent Portions of the Proceedings in
the Prior Case.
The "Fifty-Year Lease Agreement" (R. 287)
Under which this controversy arose was executed on
November 6, 1946 by the predecessors in interest to the
parties to this litigation. Inter alia, the Lease provides
4
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a
common law trust, and J O H N
PAUL JONES, ROBERT JONES,
J O H N RUSSELL RITTER,
DONALD W. McEWEN and
BARRY P H I L L I P S ,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No.
13919

vs
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF
T H E NATURE OF T H E CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages
claiming that defendant had breached the terras of a
1
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certain Fifty-Year Lease covering a gypsum ore deposit at Sigurd, Utah, as construed by Order Amending Declaratory Judgment entered by the District
Court of Sevier County on November 4, 1973.1 Defendant denied plaintiffs' claim and affirmatively asserted that plaintiffs' interpretation of the subject
Lease Agreement, as construed by prior Judgment of
the Court below, is erroneous as a matter of fact and as
a matter of law.

D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
This matter was tried by the Court sitting without
a jury on September 30, 1974. At the trial, the Court
ruled as a matter of law that an opinion of the Utah
Supreme Court2 and the Order of the District Court
of Sevier County amending Declaratory Judgment (R.
411) on remand from this Court, had perpetually fixed
as the only permissible accounting method to be used
in determining net profit royalties under the Lease, that
procedure utilized in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139 through
143 (R. 141, et seq.) received in evidence by the District Court in the prior case.3 The Court, over defend"i American Gypsum Trust, et al, v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation,
Civil No. 6307. This action will be referred to herein as the
former or prior case or trial.
2 American Gypsum Trust, et al, v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation,
Case No. 12887, 30 Utah 2d 6, 512 P.2d 658 (1973).
3 It should be pointed out that the Clerk of the Court below erred
in preparing the index to the Record on Appeal. The second
page of the index contains two.-errors. The first indicates that
the transcript pages of the "Proceedings held on September 30,
1974" are separately numbered from "1-40" when in fact they
are separately numbered from 1-130. The second indicates that
there were "Proceedings held November 14, 1974" and that the
pages of the transcript of such proceedings are separately num-
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in paragraph Second for a tonnage royalty on "all rock
removed from the demised premises", for a "minimum
annual rental" and for a 7% royalty computed upon
the "annual net profit of the Lessee". A dispute in the
computation of the 7% net profit gave rise to the controversy between the parties. The dispute was controlled by paragraph Second, subparagraph E which
reads in pertinent part:
In addition to the payment of the rentals set out
above in paragraphs 'A' to T)' [tonnage and
minimum royalties], both inclusive, the Lessee
covenants and agrees to pay the Lessor as rent
for said demised premises during the said demised term of fifty (50) years seven (7%) percent of the annual net profit of the Lessee, before deduction of Federal and State income
taxes, but excluding from the computation of
said annual net profits all net profits and/or
losses of the Lessee from the manufacture, sale
or other disposition of all materials and products
other than raw materials taken from the demised
premises or other than products manufactured or
processed from such raw materials. . . .
The Lessee and the Lessor covenant and agree
that the net profit, aforesaid, shall be determined
in accordance with sound accounting principles
and practices in the gypsum industry, and Lessee, and his assigns, agree that the business operation shall be carried on in a prudent and business-like manner for all interests concerned. In
the event of any disagreement between the Lessor and the Lessee, or his assigns, hereunder
with respect to items of either income or deductions for determining net prof it, the parties shall

5
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be bound by the final determination of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for Federal income
tax purposes for the year in which the dispute
arises. . . .
By the terms of paragraph Fifth, the 7% royalty
provision is made subject to an express proviso that
"rock of the kind and quality needed can be supplied . . . " from the leased premises at Sigurd, Utah.
Following the former trial before the Court without a jury, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson entered
judgment on March 28, 1972 in which he ruled that
defendant had not properly computed the 7% net profit
royalty. H e then entered Judgment in the sum of
$315,724.18 against defendant. H e also entered judgment declaring that during the remaining term of the
Fifty-Year Lease, and "so long as there are mineable
and processable reserves on the leased premises", defendant :
(a) Must operate its Sigurd plant at not less than
a production level of 128,539,000 square feet of gypsum
wallboard; provided that a sufficient market was available for its sale; and
'(b) Net profit royalties must be computed "in the
manner exemplified by plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-141 inclusive". (R. 33-35)
The 128,539,000 square feet minimum production
level listed in the declaratory part of the Judgment was
premised upon Finding of Fact No. 27 (R. 24) in which
6
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Judge Erickson specifically found that defendant must
"operate the Sigurd Plant [in the future] at not less
than the average 1965, 1966 and 1967 production levels
(128,539,000 square feet) . . . ^Furthermore, the same
minimum production level was a necessary ingredient in
Exhibits 129 through 141 (R. 141, et seq.) referred to
in the Declaratory Judgment which also underpinned
the computation in support of the money judgment.
b) Pertinent Portions of the Decree of this Court
in the prior case.
An appeal was duly perfected by defendant from
both the fixed damage and declaratory portions of the
Judgment in the prior case. Defendant sought a reversal of the money judgment claiming, among other
reasons, that Exhibits 139-141 were not supported by
sufficient foundation and were inadmissible in evidence
as a matter of law. Defendant at trial had objected to
those exhibits upon that ground. They were received
in evidence by the Trial Judge, over objection upon the
ground that "plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Georgia-Pacific
Corporation has not maintained its books and records
of account in connection with the operation of the Sigurd plant and the leased premises in a manner which
will permit a proper accounting of the net profit lease
rentals due to plaintiffs under the lease." (Para. 3 of
Conclusions of Law in prior case; It. 28)
One of the principal arguments made by defendant before this Court in the prior appeal attacking the
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declaratory portion of the Judgment was that "Finding
of Fact No. 27" requiring future operation of the plant
at not less than the average 1965, 1966 and 1967 production levels (128,539,000 square feet) was erroneous
as a matter of law.
The opinion of this Court in that case [R. 36; 30
Utah 2d 6, 512 P.2d 658 (1973)] was written for the
majority by Justice Henroid and was filed on July 16,
1973. The Court affirmed the judgment below in the
prior case with respect to the money judgment but
reversed the Declaratory Judgment for prospective relief to the extent founded upon Finding No. 27 (requiring production at the '65-'67 levels of 128,539,000 square
feet). In this regard, the Court stated (30 Utah 2d
at 12;R. 39):
The terminology of Finding 27 that the income
under the lease would be determinable if G-P
"has a sufficient market" in the Western market
found by the trial court is calculated to provoke
perennial litigation, and there is nothing in the
lease to justify such provocation. There could
be a market in the area, but G-P may not want
to enter it because it might be quite unprofitable.
The finding's fallacy is an interdiction to use a
market in the area if there is one. All we can
glean out of the lease is that if there is, G-P
and/or its subsidiaries or other agency under its
direct or indirect control, or its successors,
choose to enter and make sales in it, there is a
duty absolute to use Sigurd ore and pay tribute
to the Lessor according to the leasehold's terms
as stated above. So being, Finding 27 is held

8
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to be not only irrelevant to the facts, but irreverant to the leasehold.
Our conclusion as to Finding 27, therefore, is
that it is not supported by the wording of the
requirements of the lease or the facts, as to either
of its two facets.
Considering the decision by its four corners, the
Court sustained the money judgment which was premised in major part upon Finding No. 27 but reversed
that portion of the Declaratory Judgment for future
relief founded upon that Finding and remanded the
matter to the District Court for further proceedings
to amend the Declaratory Judgment consistent with the
Court's opinion. The author judge, in explaining why
this ruling was not internally inconsistent, stated (30
Utah 2d at 13; R. 40):

V

We conclude that the money judgment of the
trial court be and it hereby is affirmed, as is the
rest thereof, including that portion sustaining
the accounting procedure reflected in Exhibits
139-141, but excepting that portion of the 'requirements' portion of the lease discussed hereinabove. That part is reversed with instructions
to modify the same in consonance with the observations and opinions stated here.
With respect to the use of the years 1965-7 [as
provided in Finding No. 27] as a basis for the
money judgment, we think that because of evidence reasonably showing inaccessability of records under the discovery process, the trial court,
using available, admissible evidence, fairly appraised the situation as to amounts due under
the lease, — possibly even in defendant's favor,

9
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as not to have been unsupported by past records,
but conservative and just to both sides of this
case.
Hence, it follows that this Court specifically affirmed the findings and conclusions of Judge Erickson to the effect that Exhibits 139-141 were admissible
for the computation of money damages only because
of the "inaccessibility of records" (emphasis added)
made available "under the discovery process". Accordingly, the money judgment was affirmed although necessarily grounded upon Exhibits 139-141. However,
the Declaratory Judgment, also grounded in the Trial
Court upon Exhibits 139-141, was reversed and remanded with instruction to modify the same in consonance with the observation and opinion of this Court.
Parenthetically, we note that the interpretation
placed by the Court below upon this Court's opinion in
the prior case demonstrates that the "perennial litigation" sought to be avoided in Judge Henroid's opinion
is the very product of that opinion.
c) The Proceedings on Bern and:
1) Plaintiffs" Motion
Conclusions and Judgment.

to Modify

Findings,

After remand by this Court, plaintiffs filed in the
Trial Court a "Motion to Modify Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pursuant to
Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court of the State
of LTtah". (R. 416) That motion, as here pertinent, in10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Following the Court's pronouncement, plaintiffs
called their only witness, an accountant, Mr. Grant
Caldwell. (Tr. 42) H e testified that he had been engaged by plaintiffs to compute the 7% net profit royalty for the years 1971 through 1973 in the same manner
and to the extent possible "identical" with the procedures used in the prior case in preparing Exhibits 139
through 143. (Tr. 49) H e carried out that assignment
and his work product was received in evidence over objection as Exhibits 129A through 148A. (Id.)
In preparing these accounting exhibits, Mr. Caldwell relied upon the same foundational assumptions of
fact relied upon in the prior case, as well as additional
assumptions equally unfounded. The assumptions in
the prior case, as stated at pages 44 and 57 of Appellant's Brief to this Court are:
a) That the price decline in the Sigurd plant Western market area was caused solely by Appellant in its
operation of the Lovell, Wyoming and Acme, Texas
plants (which were not embraced by the Fifty-Year
Lease Agreement and were not operated by the Lessee
at the time the same was executed), and
b) That the Sigurd plant should have experienced
profit levels in 1965-70 (1971-73 in the present case)
equal to profit levels of 1962-64, and
c) That gypsum products could have been sold
on the West Coast at the same profit levels in the years
1965-70 (1971-73 in the present case) as in the years
1962,1963 and 1964, and

15
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d) That during the years 1967-68 (1971-73 in the
present case), the Sigurd plant could have produced at
the 1967 production level and at the same profit level
as reached in the years 1962-64.
In connection with his accounting testimony, Mr.
Caldwell admitted:
a) That his expertise was in the field of accounting, not economics or marketing. (Tr. 77-78)
b) That in applying his assumptions and preparing his accounting exhibits, he had taken the highest
production years reflected by records available to him
(1965-1967) (Tr. 80) and the highest profit years reflected by the records available to him (1962-1964) (Tr.
78) and had utilized the same as the base for the 197173 accounting period. Hence, in extrapolating his figures, he ignored wholly the actual cost and profit records
which were available to him, but seized upon and used
for his computations the highest production level (1967)
and the highest profit level (1962-64) the Sigurd plant
had experienced in more than 25 years of operation.
(Tr. 105). And he did this without having performed
any studies as to economic and marketing factors in the
market place for the years being considered. (Tr. 77)
c) That accounting records were available to him
from which the per unit costs of production for years
1971 through 1973 could be computed. H e also had
available to him records from which the sales price to
all customers could be determined for the entire Sigurd

16
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(R. 7) The prayer of the complaint, accordingly and
incorrectly, sought an accounting to determine the
amount due on that unfounded theory and for judgment in that amount. Defendant, by its Answer (It.
73), generally denied and thereby placed in issue plaintiffs' erroneous allegation that the 7% royalty must,
or indeed may, be computed for years 1971-73 on the
basis of those exhibits submitted in the prior case. Trial
thereon was conducted by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs
on September 30, 1974. The judgment appealed from
was entered by him on November 15, 1974. (It. 106)
3. Evidence presented by Plaintiffs and Received
by the Court over Defendant's Objections.
The trial proceedings started and finished on the
mistaken note that the Trial Judge's rulings were absolutely fixed and controlled by the opinion of this
Court in the prior case and that Trial Judge was
bound by the opinion of this Court to look only to the
"manner exemplified in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143"
in the prior case for the computation of 7% net profit
royalties. Defendant insisted below, and we assert here,
that the Trial Judge misinterpreted the opinion of this
Court in the prior case. At the end of the opening states
ments of the parties, the Court below stated the following from the bench (It .34):
[ I ] f s my understanding that I should look to the
manner of accounting as set forth in those three
exhibits [Exhibits 139-143] and that's what I'm
going to do and so if it is a matter of law, we
will decide that right now and it is decided.
14
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us by way of declaratory was that the method
utilized prior to 1965 was the one that is proper
under the lease. [Emphasis added]
4) Declaratory Judgment entered by the court below on remand.
On November 14, 1973, the Court signed the substituted "Order Modifying Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment" (R. 411) prepared by plaintiffs incorporating the concept contained in Mr. McCarthy's language quoted immediately above. That order provided,
inter alia, that defendant's duty to make sales of gypsum
products from the Lessor's mining properties was subject to the condition that "rock of the hind and quality
needed can be supplied from the Leased Premises . . / '
(Emphasis added) as requested by defendant. (R.
413) I t further provided that the 7% net royalty provision in the future must be calculated by the accounting "method approved by the Lessor and utilized by
the parties in the years prior to 1965." (R. 415; emphasis added)
2. The Filing of the Instant

Action.

The complaint (R. 1) fostering this appeal was
filed in the District Court of Sevier County on June 7,
1974. The complaint erroneously alleged, contrary to
the express terms of the aforementioned modified Order
dated November 14, 1973 (R. 415), that 7% net royalties for calqendar years 1971, 1972 and 1973 must be
computed under the method "exemplified in Exhibits
139 through 143, received in evidence in the prior case".

13
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itially and improperly proposed that Finding of Fact
No. 27, Conclusion of Law No. 8 and Judgment each be
amended to require future computations of net profit
rentals under the Fifty-Year Lease to be made "in the
manner exemplified in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143, inclusive . . . " (Id.)
Hence, initially the principal thrust of plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend was to attempt to fix perpetually
as the only and proper accounting procedure, as did
Judge Erickson's Judgment which was reversed and
remanded by this Court, that method reflected by Exhibits 139-143 as used in the prior trial.
2) Defendant's response to Motion to Amend Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.
Defendant thereupon duly filed its "Objections to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment". (R. 422) In
those objections, defendant pointed out that plaintiffs'
proposed modifications would be inconsistent both with
(1) the clear, unambiguous and uncontroverted provisions of the Lease Agreement and with (2) the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, defendant moved that the Trial Court delete
completely all reference to Exhibits 139 through 143
and to add specifically two provisions which defendant
contended were necessary to "modify" the judgment "in
conconance' with the provisions of the lease itself and
the "observations and opinions" stated in the Supreme
Court decision. Those changes were:

11
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(a) Insertion of the following language as a proviso: "provided that rock of the kind and quality needed
can be supplied from the leased premises."
(b) Adding, in lieu of the language to be deleted
relating to prior Exhibits 139-143, a requirement that
the 7% net profit royalties be computed in the "manner
utilized by the parties in years prior to 1965."
3) Hearing on plaintiffs' Motions
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment.

to

Modify

At the hearing on November 14, 1973 on plaintiffs'
Motion to Modify and defendant's objections thereto,
plaintiffs withdrew their proposed modifications and
accepted conceptually those of defendant's objections
discussed above. Plaintiffs consented to adding the following proviso: "provided rock of the kind and quality
needed can be supplied from the Lessor's mining properties." Plaintiffs also consented to and actually proposed, as defendant had done in its objections, the deletion of reference to Exhibits 139-143 and a substitution
in lieu thereof of language requiring computation of
the 7% net royalty "by the accounting method approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in the
years prior to 1965." (Emphasis added)
In so doing, Dennis McCarthy, Esq., one of counsel for plaintiffs, admitted at page 6 of the transcript
of that hearing that:
/ think the principle i* correctly recognized by
the defendant that what in effect the court gave

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

marketing area for each of the years in question. But,
these he rejected in favor of his hypothesis. (Tr. 8687)
d) That he did not take into consideration the
Federally imposed price freeze during years 1971
through 1973. (Tr. 90)
e) That he further assumed that per unit costs
were the same in 1971-73 as in the years 1962-64. (Tr.
89-90)
f) That he assumed that the "Acme", Texas plant
was selling gypsum products in the "Sigurd marketing
area" 4 in years 1971-73. (Tr. 84)
Defendant asserted below and argues herein that
this "evidence" was inadmissible and should not have
been received.
4. Evidence Proffered by Defendant but Rejected
by the Court.
After plaintiffs rested, defendant made the following proffer of proof which it asserted could be
proven at this trial. The Trial Court accepted the
proffer but refused to consider the evidence proffered.
(Tr. 110)
4 The "Sigurd marketing area", not referred to in the Fifty-Year
Lease Agreement, but defined in the original Judgment entered
by Judge Erickson and affirmed in the majority opinion of this
Court, is the area occupied by "California, Oregon, Washington,
Nevada, Idaho, Utah, Western Montana, Western Wyoming and
Western Colorado."
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Mr. Fred Oliver, a Certified Public Accountant
and partner in Haskins & Sells, a National accounting
firm, would be called as a witness and he would testify
as follows: (Tr. 108, et seq.)
a) That he had been retained by defendants to review the Lease language and the Declaratory Judgment
entered in the prior case, together with the Supreme
Court opinion in the prior case, and to determine therefrom the proper accounting methods to be utilized and
the net profit royalties, if any, due to plaintiffs for
calendar years 1971-73.
b) That in the course of this assignment, he had
examined plaintiffs' accounting exhibits, received in
evidence by the Court and that the same were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
procedures as required by the Lease and were not in
conformance with the Declaratory Judgment of the
District Court in the prior case because they did not:
(1) utilize available actual production records for
the years in which the royalties were computed;
(2) utilize available records showing actual costs
for the years in which the calculation was
made;
(3) utilize available records showing actual sales
prices to the end customer in the years for
which the computation was made;
(4) consider the available evidence indicating the
amount of ore reserves. (Tr. 111-112)
18
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c) That each of the assumptions of fact relied upon
by plaintiffs' witness Caldwell to support his conclusions was not a proper accounting assumption. (Tr.
112)
d) That sound accounting principles, and the provisions of the amended Declaratory Judgment, require
the use of actual data, which was available and examined
by the witness, for the years in question in computing
net royalty profits for calendar years 1971, 1972 and
1973 and that the computations made by plaintiffs' witness Caldwell were improper projections and extrapolations based upon profit margins in other years and
grounded upon unrelated and unreliable assumed data.
(Tr. 113)
e) That accounting records were available to make
actual computations, without projections or extrapolations from prior operations, of profit royalties due in
the years in question following meticulously the accounting procedures approved by the Lessor and utilized
by the parties prior to 1965. (Tr. 113-114)
f) That the actual amount of net profit royalty
due if production were to be limited to actual production
at the Sigurd plant during calendar years 1971-73 is
$161,597 (R. 369; Def. Ex. C).
g) That the amount of net profit royalty due if all
sales in the historic Sigurd market area were to be considered, taking into account the depletion of ore available at Sigurd for the manufacture of all gypsum products involved is $247,157. (R. 364; Def. Ex. C).
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h) That accounting exhibits, which were offered
but rejected by the Court, showed the proper computation of net profit royalties under the assumptions
made in the next preceding two paragraphs. (Tr.- 113;
Def.Ex. C).
By way of additional facts to support Mr. Oliver's
accounting testimony and exhibits, defendant would
call as witnesses the quarry superintendent for the Sigurd plant, the plant engineer for the Sigurd plant, the
quarry and maintenance superintendent for the competitive and contiguous United States Gypsum Company plant, the production superintendent for GeorgiaPacific Corporation who also served as a United Nations consultant on gypsum reserves, and independent
consultant H . J . VanderVeer of H . J. VanderVeer &
Associates, Consulting Engineers and Geologists, Salt
Lake City, each of whom would testify that as of August 31, 1974, estimated reserves of the kind and quality
of rock required to manufacture gypsum products from
the leased premises were approximately 58,420 tons, with
a stockpile of ore of 21,033 tons, which amounts of ore
would be depleted in a few months from the date of
trial. (Tr. 107-108)
Mr. Glenn Wilson, Vice-President of GeorgiaPacific Corporation, in charge of all gypsum operations,
if permitted to testify, would state. (Tr. 100-106):
a) That contrary to Caldwell's testimony, per unit
costs for the manufacture of gypsum wallboard did not
remain constant from the base years utilized by Cald20
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well (1962-64) to the years 1971-73; that per unit costs
increased in excess of $3.00 per 1,000 square feet between those periods which, alone, would have resulted
in a profit decline of $400,000 per year and a net royalty
decline of $28,000 per year; that Federal price controls
and freezes were in effect during the calendar years in
question and throughout virtually all of the period involved (1971-73), which prevented defendant from following the pricing trends incorrectly assumed by Caldwell ;
b) That the base years, 1962-64, utilized by Caldwell to determine "profit margin" were the most profitable years in the entire history of the Sigurd plant and
that the years 1965 through 1967, assumed by Caldwell
as his production base, were the highest volume of production in the history of the Sigurd plant.
c) That during years 1971-73, defendant's Acme
plant did not sell gypsum products in the "historic
market area" of the Sigurd plant as defined in the Declaratory Judgment and thus could not have acted to
depress the market price of gypsum wallboard, contrary to the assumption of Mr. Caldwell. (Tr. 102-03)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E TRIAL COURT E R R E D BY RULING AS A MATTER O F LAW T H A T T H E
ONLY PERMISSIBLE ACCOUNTING METHOD TO BE USED IN D E T E R M I N I N G N E T
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PROFIT ROYALTIES UNDER THE LEASE
WAS T H E PROCEDURE U T I L I Z E D IN EXH I B I T S 139 T H R O U G H 143 I N T H E P R I O R
CASE.
This appeal turns upon whether or not defendant
breached the provisions of a Fifty-Year Lease (R.
287) in computing lease royalty payments for calendar
years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The Lease itself, together
with an amended Declaratory Judgment (R. 411) interpreting certain of its provisions, were before the
Court below. However, rather than to afford to the
Lease language, and to the language of the amended
Declaratory Judgment their plain meaning, the Court
below erroneously seized upon language contained in
the opinion of this Court entered in the prior litigation
between the parties as mandating a sole, perpetual and
arbitrary method of computing royalties. This method
is contrary to the Lease provisions and to the amended
Declaratory Judgment. In this regard, the Court below erroneously ruled, at the close of opening statements at page 34 of the transcript:
[I]t's my understanding that I should look to the
manner of accounting as set forth in those three
or four exhibits [Exhibits 139-143] and that's
what I'm going to do and so if it is a matter of
law, we will decide that right now and it is
decided.
_;•-—•• In this argument, we shall first discuss and show
the clarity and unambiguity of the provisions of the
Lease and of the amended Declaratory Judgment. If
this Court should find ambiguity in the language of
22
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either the Lease or the amended Declaratory Judgment,
we submit that such ambiguity should be resolved by
looking to the admissions of plaintiffs below; and further that plaintiffs are estopped by their action below
from here rejecting the very language which they sponsored. Finally, we will argue that the amendments made
to the Declaratory Judgment, on remand, by the Court
below are consistent with the prior opinion of this Court.
1. The Language of the Lease:
The lease provides in pertinent part (P. Ex. 1-A,
p . 7 ; R . 293):
The Lessee and Lessor covenant and agree that
the net profit, aforesaid, shall be determined in
accordance with sound accounting principles and
practices in the gypsum industry, and lessee, and
his assigns, agree that the business operations
shall be carried on in a prudent and businesslike
manner for all interests concerned. [Emphasis
added]
It appears to us that this particular language is
free from ambiguity. It follows that the same binds
the parties according to the plain meaning of the words
which they chose to govern their relationship. This rule
is clearly enunciated in Bryant v. Deseret News Pub.
Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951) as follows:
Plaintiff also invokes the rule of interpretation
that doubtful, ambiguous terms in a contract
should be interpreted against the party who has
chosen the terms. 12 Am. Jur., Sections 250 and
252. W e agree that these rules of construction
should be considered in determining what is a
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reasonable and fair interpretation of the intention of the parties. However, if the language is
clear and is not susceptible of more than one interpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the
words must be used.[Emphasis added]
This language also binds the Court for it may not
substitute its notions for the bargain negotiated by the
parties without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees which are discussed below. We also note, parenthetically, as shown in the appeal to this Court of the
prior case, that the "terms" of the agreement here were
those enunciated by plaintiffs' attorney Willis W . Hitter who acted as the scrivener and who also acted as a
long-time trustee of the plaintiff trust. I t follows that
any arguable ambiguity in the lease language must be
interpreted against the interests of the plaintiffs.
It should be noted that this language was not
amended by the original Judgment in the prior case,
by this Court's decision or by the Order on Remand
amending the Judgment. The language stands. It binds
the Court and the parties.
It follows that the Court below committed grievous error for it refused to receive or consider competent
testimony that plaintiffs' accounting was not "in accordance with sound accounting principles and practices" for the particular years in question. The Trial
Court further erred by refusing to receive or consider
competent testimony showing that royalties as computed by defendant were "in accordance with sound
accounting principles and practices."
24
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Hence, the Court below accepted plaintiffs' version of hotly contested facts, wholly refusing to consider defendant's evidence. This action is tantamount
to the granting of a Motion for Summary J u d g m e n t in
the presence of genuine issues of fact. The rule of law
here applicable has been restated many times by this
Court. Illustrative is this Court's opinion found in
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 U t a h 2d 184, 187,
506 P.2d 1274,1276 (1973) :
The fundamental controlling rule in this case is
that summary j u d g m e n t should be granted only
when it clearly appears that there are no issues
of material fact in dispute which if resolved in
favor of the adverse p a r t y would entitle him to
prevail. A p p l y i n g that rule to what we have said
herein it is our opinion that there should be a
plenary trial and resolution of all of the issues
tendered by the parties to this lawsuit. I t is remanded for that purpose. Costs to defendant
(appellant). [Footnote omitted]
I t follows that the J u d g m e n t must be reversed.
2. The Language of the Order Amending
lavatory Judgment on Remand.

the Dec-

On remand from this Court, the Court below entered its Order amending the Declaratory J u d g m e n t .
The pertinent language from that Order reads (R.
415):
4. T h a t the Court hereby declares that until the
Fifty Y e a r Lease between the parties, which is
hereby found to be valid, subsisting and binding
in accordance with its terms, expires, and so long
25
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as there is rock of the kind and quality needed
on the Leased Premises therein described, defendant Georgia-Pacific Corporation and/or its
subsidiaries and controlled agencies shall (a)"if
they choose to enter and make sales of gypsum
products in the historic Sigurd Plant market area
as defined in modified Finding of Fact No. 27
herein, then all such products sold in said area
must be manufactured with gypsum ore taken
from the Leased Premises; and (b) shall compute and pay to plaintiffs net profit rentals as
provided in the Fifty Year Lease by the method
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the
parties in the years prior to 1965. [Emphasis
added]
We assert that this language likewise is free from
uncertainty or ambiguity and, for the same reasons,
binds the parties and the Court. Furthermore, this clear
language binds the parties and the Court under the doctrine of res adjudicata. In support of this contention,
we quote from Tiff any Productions, Inc., Limited, et
al v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County,
et at, 22 P.2d 275, 276 (Cal. App. 1933) :

;.

Somewhat reduced in form, the second question
propounded by the petitioner herein in substance
is whether the ruling by the court on the first
motion to increase the amount of the undertaking
was res adjudicata. If it was, of course, it should
follow the ordinary rule obtainable with reference
to judgments; that is to say, that the court thererafter had no authority by its order either to
modify, or to reverse the former order made by
it, In other words, if the first order in question
.. ranked as a judgment, the court thereafter was
26
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unauthorized to disturb it in the manner or by
the method adopted by the defendant for that
purpose. And although disaffirming any intention to accurately define what is meant by the
expression 'res adjudicata,' as a starting point
for ensuing observations it may be assumed that
included within the boundaries of a complete exposition of the significance which properly may
be ascribed to the term is the general doctrine
that in any action or proceeding an issuable fact
once legally decided therein is thereafter beyond
dispute as between or among the parties either in
that or in any other action or proceeding in which
the same parties or their respective privies may
be litigants. (Emphasis added)
The language of the amended Judgment (R. 415)
specifically imposes the following three constraints:
a) The accounting procedure must consider all
sales by defendant "in the historic Sigurd market area'3
Plaintiffs' evidence, received over objection, admittedly does not consider all of such sales. Instead,
plaintiffs' accounting is premised upon only the sale of
128,539,000 square feet in each year, relying upon Judge
JErickson's original Finding No. 27 which compelled
production at that level. One need only to look to the
prior opinion of this Court (30 Utah 2d 6; R. 36) to
show that this approach is erroneous. In that opinion,
plaintiffs' foundational Finding No. 27 (128,539,000
square feet) was reversed with instructions to the Trial
Court to amend the same on remand. In reversing,
Justice Henroid stated: "So being, Finding 27 is held
to be not only irrelevant to the facts, but irreverani to
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the leasehold." (30 Utah 2d at 12; R. 39; emphasis
added).
But to add insult to injury, the Court below, after
having erroneously received this evidence, proceeded
erroneously to refuse to consider competent testimony
proffered by defendant to account for all "sales of gypsum products in the historic Sigurd market area" during 1971,1972 and 1973. (Tr. 110)
••

•

-

\

This requirement that only Sigurd ore be sold in
the Sigurd historical marketing area raises a practical
problem as shown by defendant's proffer of proof. A
substantial portion of the gypsum products sold by defendant in Sigurd's historical marketing area during the
years 1971 through 1973 came from Lovell rather than
from Sigurd ore. Defendant was not constrained to
limit its sales in the Sigurd historical market to products
made from Sigurd ore until the entry of the final
Amended Judgment in November of 1973, near the
close (£fthe accounting period involved. To conform to
the objective of the language of paragraph 4 of the
Declaratory Judgment, as amended, since it was impossible for defendant to conform to it literally, defendant proposed as one alternative in its offer of proof
that plaintiffs be paid a royalty upon all gypsum products sold in the Sigurd historical marketing area repardless of the source of the ore from which the products
were produced. (Def. Ex. C)
The use of this alternative requires review of ore
reserves available at Sigurd. This is true, as noted be-.
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low, because both the Lease itself and the Declaratory
Judgment condition defendant's duty upon availability
of rock at Sigurd of the kind and quality needed. Defendant's offer of proof demonstrated that there were
not sufficient reserves of "rock of the kind and quality
needed" in the Leased Premises to produce at Sigurd
all of the gypsum products sold in the Sigurd marketing
area during the accounting period under study. Therefore, in defendant's Exhibit C, offered but rejected by
the Court below, net profit royalties are limited to those
that could have been generated by available ores at
Sigurd.
For these reasons, the Trial Court erred both in
admitting plaintiffs' evidence, based as it is wholly upon
the Finding 27 level of production, and in excluding accounting evidence embracing all sales in the historic
Sigurd market area, for which, according to the prior
opinion of this Court, defendant must "pay tribute".
(30 Utah 2d at 12; R. 39) Accordingly, the Judgment
should be reversed for this reason alone.
b) Defendant's duty to pay net profit royalties is
expressly conditioned upon the availability "in the
Leased Premises" of "rock of the hind and quality
needed"
As quoted above, plaintiffs ignored this provision
of the Declaratory Judgment (R. 415) and objected
to evidence offered by defendant to show that there was
not sufficient "rock of the kind and quality needed on
the Leased Premises" to manufacture all of the gypsum
products sold in the "historic Sigurd plant market area"
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during years 1971, 1972 and 1973. The Court below
erroneously sustained this objection and refused to admit any evidence at all on this subject. This error alone
requires reversal.
c) The "net profit rentals" were required to be
computed "by the method approved by the Lessor and
utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965".
The accounting evidence offered by plaintiffs and
received by the Court over defendant's objection, admittedly was not in accordance with this language. This
evidence is grounded upon a production level never
achieved prior to 1965, is not computed from actual
available cost and sales records for the years in question
as was "utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965";
instead it relies upon production and sales from plants
in Lovell, Wyoming and Acme, Texas that were not
even in existence prior to 1965, and is based upon numerous assumptions and extrapolations never known to
or "utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965". As
we argue in more detail below, the Court erred in even
admitting the evidence of plaintiffs.
But, a more serious error was the Court's rejection
of the testimony of Mr. Fred Oliver, Managing partner
of the accounting firm, Haskins & Sells, in Utah:
a) showing the precise nature of the accounting
method approved by the Lessor and utilized
by the parties in the years prior to 1965;
b) showing that actual records are available for
30
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years 1971, 1972 and 1973 from which the
net royalties can be computed in the precise
manner "approved by the Lessor and utilized
by the parties in the years prior to 1965";
c) showing that plaintiffs' accounting does not
follow that required "method";
d) showing the amount of net royalties due utilizing that required "method". (Tr. 108, et
seq.)
This proffered evidence was relevant, and indeed
required, to make Findings under the concise language
of the amended Declaratory Judgment. The Court's
error in rejecting this evidence alone requires reversal.
3. The Admissions of Plaintiffs

Below.

Even assuming arguendo some ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of the Lease or of the amended
Declaratory Judgment, the plaintiffs are in no position
to avoid or explain away the same and rely on proving
their case by reference to the first trial or to this Court's
prior opinion. In that connection, the record shows that
after the remand by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs initially filed in the Trial Court a "Motion to Modify Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment,
pursuant to Opinion and Order of the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah". (R. 416) That motion, as here
pertinent, erroneously proposed that Finding of Fact
No. 27, Conclusion of Law No. 8 and Judgment each
be amended to require future computations of net profit
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rentals under the Lease as follows: "in the manner exemplified in plaintiff s' Exhibits 139-143, inclusive
(R. 420) Hence, the principal thrust of plaintiffs' original-"Motion to Amend" was to fix perpetually as the
only proper accounting procedure, that method reflected
by Exhibits 139-143 used in the first trial.
Defendant duly filed its Objections to Plaintiffs'
Motion to Modify Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment. (R. 422) Defendant pointed out
therein that plaintiffs' proposed modifications would
be inconsistent both with the clear, unambiguous and uncontroverted provisions of the Lease Agreement and
with the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court.
Defendant specifically moved that the Trial Court delete completely all reference to Exhibits 139 through
143 and add two provisions which defendant contended were necessary to make the proposed modifications of the judgment consistent with the provisions of
the Lease itself and the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court. Those changes were:
a) Insertion of the following language as a proviso : "provided that rock of the kind and quality needed
can be supplied from the leased premises". (Emphasis
added) This language was obviously mandatory because of the provisions of the lease and the language of
the majority opinion.
b) Adding, in lieu of the language to be deleted
relating to prior Exhibits 139-143, a requirement that
the 7% net profit royalties be computed in the "manner
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utilized by the parties in years prior to 1965". (R. 422,
et seq.; emphasis added) This change was obviously
required to conform with the clear language of the lease
and the reversal of Finding No. 27 by this Court and the
instructions of this Court on remand.
At the hearing on plaintiffs' Motion to Modify and
defendant's objections thereto, plaintiffs withdrew their
proposed initial modifications and accepted conceptually
those of defendant's objections which are stated above.
In that connection, plaintiffs consented to, and indeed
proposed, the adding of the following proviso: "provided rock of the kind and quality needed can be supplied from the Lessor's mining properties." They also
consented to and actually proposed at the hearing to
amend the Judgment of Judge Erickson on November
14, 1973 the deletion of reference to Exhibits 139-143
and a substitution in lieu thereof of language requiring
computation of the 7% net royalty "by the accounting
method approved by the Lessor and utilized by the
parties in the years prior to 1965" (Emphasis added)
In so doing, Dennis McCarthy, Esq., one of counsel for plaintiffs, stated in pertinent part at pages 5, et
seq. of the transcript of the November, 1973 hearing:
Now, your Honor, this [the original Motion to
Amend Findings, Conclusions and Judgment]
represented my best effort when I wrote this
motion, but after I reviewed the objections of
the defendant on this Finding 27, they suggested
number one of course, we're not entitled to anything as far as Finding 27 is concerned. Then
they say even assuming arguendo —
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Reading from their objections . . .
— proposed by plaintiff it's appropriate the last
two lines thereof must be deleted and the following language substituted in lieu of.
"Method
utilized by the parties in the year prior to 1965"
—and that your H o n o r , of course, eliminates the
reference to the particular exhibit which the court
based its damage calculations on; and the justifications for using those exhibits of course was that
from the records of Georgia-Pacific that were
supplied to us, they took the lease over in 1965.
F r o m the records they supplied to us it was impossible to make a calculation so we had to do an
extrapolation as to how he could arrive or as to
what method of accounting would be utilized.
W h a t was the method in effect prior to 1965, but
rather than argue with the defendant about this
particular thing, I have proposed to in substance
adopt their suggestion and in a proposed order
which I had prepared for the court, I have made
a change in F i n d i n g 27 on the bottom by p u t t i n g
the change in in accordance with their suggestions,
calculated by the accounting method
approved
by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in the
years prior to 1965.
Now, it may be that the records they have will
not allow such a calculation, and if so, I suppose
we'll have to go to some sort of an extrapolation
exhibit, such as was contained in Exhibits 139
and 143, but at least I think the principle is correctly recognized by the defendant that what in
effect the court gave us by way of declaratory
was that the method utilized prior to 1965 was
the one that is proper under the lease/' [ E m p h a sis added]
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The complaint fostering the instant appeal was
filed on June 7, 1974. In the complaint and at the trial
below, plaintiffs renewed their attempt, abandoned on
the record below, to fix as the only proper accounting
procedures, that accounting method reflected by Exhibits 139-143 used in the prior trial. The Trial Court's
action in the latter trial in adopting plaintiffs' contentions in this regard is contrary to the generally accepted
rule of law enunciated as follows in 2 A L R 2d at page
546:
As a general proposition, a judgment entered by
agreement or consent is as conclusive on matters
in issue as one rendered after contest and trial,
and is binding in a subsequent suit insofar as it
has relevancy to the matters in issue which are
substantially identical with those adjudicated by
the former judgment.
Cases which follow this generally accepted rule are
numerous but we have elected to cite only one involving Utah litigants. In Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corp. of America, 265 F.2d 227, 235 (10th Cir.
1959), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to
say:
.
Defendant Pugsley asserts the defense of res adjudicata and obtained a summary judgment in
his favor. The basis of his defense is a judgment
of dismissal entered on stipulation of counsel by
a Utah court on March 7,' 1957, dismissing an
action brought by Pugsley against the company
to recover unpaid director's fees. The judgment
stated that the action, 'together with any possible
counterclaims relating thereto/ was dismissed
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with prejudice. . . . The point is of no avail as the
state court unquestionably had jurisdiction of
the parties and of the subject matter and had
power to enter the judgment which it did. A
judgment of dismissal pursuant to a stipulated
settlement is ordinarily a judgment on the merits
barring another action for the same cause. No
suggestion is made of fraud or collusion. Whatever claim there may be of lack of corporate
power in the absence of stockholder action should
be addressed to the Utah court. At the most it
is a collateral attack on the judgment which may
not be made here." [Emphasis added, citations
omitted]
Plaintiffs here consented to, indeed affirmatively
sponsored, the language of the amended Declaratory
Judgment which they now find to be offensive because
it would bar their recovery. Nonetheless, they are bound
thereby and should not be permitted to prosper by the
attempt here to reinstate their previously abandoned
concept. To do so would permit them to escape from
the judgment to which they consented and would violate
the doctrine of estoppel as recognized by this Court. In
Migliacco v. Davis, et al, 120 Utah 1, 232 P.2d 195
(1951), this Court paid its respect to this doctrine by
placing its imprimatur on a rule stated in American
Jurisprudence. There the Court stated at page 8 of
the Utah Reporter:
«# * * Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is
the principal by which a party who knows or
should know the truth is absolutely precluded,
both at law and in equity, from denying or asserting the contrary of, any material fact, which, by
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his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon
such words and conduct, to believe and act upon
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be
anticipated, changing his position in such a way
that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were allowed."
Application of this doctrine to the facts of this
case would preclude plaintiffs from now reasserting and
the Trial Court from holding that Exhibits 139-143 are
the sole permissible method of royalty computation after
defendant relied upon the complete abandonment by
plaintiffs of that concept in the Court below. The Judgment should therefore, be reversed.
4. The Prior Opinion of this Court is Consistent
with the Amendments to the Declaratory Judgment on
Remand and with the Position of Defendant Asserted
Herein.
The prior opinion of this Court does not hold that
the sole and perpetual method of computing future net
lease royalties is that used in preparing Exhibits 139143 in the prior case. Indeed, the contrary is true. This
is so because the original Finding No. 27 (admittedly
essential to make the royalty computations under the
Exhibit 139-143 methodology) was rejected by this
Court as being "not only irrelevant to the facts but irreverent to the leasehold". This Court further stated
in reversing as to Finding 27 (30 Utah 2d at 12; R. 39) :
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Our Conclusion as to Finding 27, therefore, is
that it is not supported by the wording of the
requirements of the lease or the facts, as to either
of its two facets.
This Court, in its opinion, cited and noted with approval, and did not change or modify, the Lease language requiring application of "sound accounting principles" in calculating lease royalties. The opinion commented favorably upon the procedures utilized by the
parties prior to 1965, stating (30 Utah 2d at 9; R. 37):
Thus, for about a quarter century and for about
half of the life of the lease, by consent and uncontroverted ratification of four predecessor
lessess not obiected to by the defendant as to
method, the formula determining the 7% net
profit rental was recognized by condescension
and silence.
I t was in keeping with this language that counsel
for plaintiffs (1) withdrew their attempt to freeze the
Exhibit 139-143 methodology into the Declaratory
Judgment, (2) admitted that "what in effect the Court
gave us by way of declaratory was that the method utilized prior to 1965 was the one that is proper under the
lease" (emphasis added), and (3) sponsored the Judgment language adopted by the Court below in its
amended Order.
The only explanation that we can find for the
action of the Trial Judge in the case from which this
appeal is taken is that he confused this Court's affirmance of the money judgment with its reversal of the
prospective declaratory judgment which was the sub-
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ject of McCarthy's admissions. In this regard, this
Court stated (30 Utah 2d at 13; R. 40) :
We conclude that the money judgment of the
trial court be and it hereby is affirmed, as is the
rest thereof, including that portion sustaining the
accounting procedure reflected in Exhibits 139141, but excepting that portion of the 'requirements' portion of the lease discussed hereinabove
[viz., original Finding 27 containing the required
production level which is necessary in making
the Ex. 139-141 computations]. That part is reversed with instructions to modify the same in
consonance with the observations and opinion
stated here. [Emphasis added]
In the next paragraph of the opinion, this Court
explained why "Finding 27" data, and hence Exhibits
139-143, could be relied upon in the case before it as
constituting the sole foundation for a money judgment
for years prior to 1971 but could not stand prospectively
for future years as part of the Declaratory Judgment.
The reason stated by this Court was that the record
presented a situation where the court found "evidence
reasonably showing inaccessibility of records under the
discovery process" for the prior period.
Judge Tibbs apparently understood this distinction
between the money judgment and declaratory judgment
language in the Opinion of this Court when he entered
the amendatory Order on remand, for the Order entered
was consistent therewith. (R. 415) However, that difference later escaped him at trial and led him to the
error here complained of.
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By reason of the foregoing arguments and authorities, it is clear that defendant's proffers of proof at
trial were relevant and admissible (1) under the Lease
language, (2) under this Court's prior opinion and (3)
under the specific language of the amending Order of
the Trial Court. It follows that the Trial Court erred
and that the Judgment must be reversed.

POINT II
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D BY ADMITTING INCOMPETENT TESTIMONY AND
D O C U M E N T A R Y E V I D E N C E OVER OBJECT I O N A S TO P R O P E R A C C O U N T I N G P R O C E D U R E S A N D C O M P U T A T I O N S O F ROYA L T Y P A Y M E N T S C L A I M E D TO B E D U E
UNDER THE LEASE.
The Trial Court erroneously received in evidence
Exhibits 139A through 148A, together with the supporting testimony of Mr. Caldwell, over objections of
defendant that the same were not supported by proper
foundation. (Tr. 45-49). The Trial Judge accepted
plaintiff's fallacious argument that since the exhibits
were identical to those received in evidence in the former case, they were admissible in the latter. We submit
that it is not that simple and that this evidence was not
admissible, here in the absence of a necessary foundational finding which the Court below cpuld not make
(1) because of Mr, CaldwelPs admissions on cross ex40
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amination5 and (2) because the Court rejected all evidence offered by defendant relating to the lack of foundation of Mr. Caldwell's evidence.
In the prior case, Judge Erickson found on the
basis of evidence before him that plaintiffs had sustained their burden of proof to establish liability for
years 1965-70 in that defendant had "departed from
accounting procedures applied" by the parties prior to
1965 and had not "carried on its business operations
under the Lease in a prudent and businesslike manner
for all interests concerned" during those years.
H e then turned to the question of damages and
considered Exhibits 139-143 only because he found from
the evidence before him for those years that defendant
had not "maintained its books and records" in a manner "which will permit a proper accounting of the net
profit lease rentals due plaintiffs under the Lease". In
affirming the use of that evidence in computing the
money judgment, this Court likewise relied upon the
foundational findings of the Court below showing "inaccessibility of records" for those years. Such foundational findings are not supportable on this record. Mr.
Caldwell testified that the records of defendant were
maintained in the same manner during 1971-73 as was
the case in 1965-70. However, defendant offered to
prove through its expert witness Fred Oliver, who had
5 The specific disclosures drawn from Mr. Caldwell upon cross
examination illuminating the lack of foundation in his evidence
(Plaintiffs' only evidence), as well as the specific evidence
offered by defendant independently establishing the lack of
foundation in Mr. Caldwell's testimony have been cited earlier
and are set forth in the Appendix attached hereto.
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personally examined defendant's books and records covering years 1971-73, that every necessary record was
available to compute net profit royalties in accordance
with sound accounting principles and by the methods
approved by the Lessor and utilized by the parties in
the years prior to 1965. (Tr. 111-112) His testimony,
together with that of Glenn Wilson, if received, would
have demonstrated the absolute falsity of each of the
numerous factual assumptions made by plaintiffs' single
witness.
In addition, to the extent the "Caldwell evidence"
is sought to be relied upon to establish liability in this
case, plaintiffs will run afoul of Rule of Evidence No.
19, adopted by this Court effective July 1, 1971. That
rule provides that a witness must either have "personal
knowledge" or "experience, training or education" relating to "relevant or material matter". Mr. Caldwell
conceded that he had neither personal knowledge nor
did he have experience, training or education concerning numerous of the matters involved. In the absence
of such expertise, he admitted that he relied wholly
upon assumptions or inferences of fact. Some of his
specific admissions in this connection have been referred
to earlier and are set forth in the Appendix attached
hereto. This brings into play the doctrine enunciated in
Jangulav. U.S. Rubber Co., 147 Mont, 98, 410 P.2d
462, 467 (1966) in which the Montana Supreme Court
stated as follows in holding erroneous the admission of
expert medical testimony not supported by actual evidence of facts which were assumed:
42
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The rules relating to testimony of an expert witness have been set forth in Irion v. Hyde, 110
Mont. 570, 105 P.2d 666. The expert must first
testify to the facts within his own knowledge or
based upon his observation upon which his opinion is based. H e must have the training and experience to draw a correct inference from facts
outside of the range of the ordinary human experience. The judgment of an expert will not
support the verdict when opposed by undisputed
facts and the dictates of common sense. Where,
as here, the conclusions of experts are based upon
facts which do not exist, or are the result of an
inference, admission over objection is erroneous.
[Emphasis added]
Here the so-called "evidence" is based upon a series
of pyramided inferences concerning which Caldwell had
neither knowledge nor experience. That alone would require rejection of the evidence under the Jangula doctrine and under the requirements of this Court's Rule
of Evidence No. 19. However, the record now before
us contains a much more compelling case for exclusion;
this for the reason that through proffers of proof with
respect to each and every "inference or assumption" relied upon by Caldwell, persons with actual knowledge
of those facts were prepared to testify that the inferences and assumptions were false as a matter of fact.
(See the attached Appendix) Since the Court below
refused to consider these facts, the "summary judgment" rules, discussed above, are here controlling. For
the purposes of this appeal, the proffered testimony
must be assumed to be true. Hence, the "undisputed
facts", for purposes of this appeal, show that the con^
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elusions and opinions of Mr. Caldwell are based upon
"facts" which "do not exist". I t follows that the "evidence" sponsored by plaintiffs and received by the Court
below is wholly without any foundation whatsoever.
In short, on this record, one is left only with the unfounded Caldwell testimony to establish the necessary
foundational finding of "inaccessibility" of accounting
records. That testimony was duly controverted by the
defendant's offer of proof. In view of the genuine
issues of fact thus resulting, the foundational finding
cannot be made and this "evidence", bottomed as it is
upon assumptions of fact admittedly beyond Caldwell's
knowledge and beyond the field of his expertise, cannot
stand. I t follows that the Judgment should be reversed.

POINT III
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN E N T E R ING FINDINGS OF FACT DETERMINING
SOUND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES AND
ACCOUNTING METHODS USED BY T H E
P A R T I E S P R I O R TO 1965 I N T H E A B S E N C E
O F E V I D E N C E A N D C O N T R A R Y TO A D M I S S I B L E E V I D E N C E ON T H A T S U B J E C T
O F F E R E D BY DEFENDANT.
The Trial Court made a specific finding (Findings
of Fact, Para. 4; R. 103) that the plaintiffs' accounting
testimony and exhibits received in evidence were in conformance with the "best and proper accounting procedure's] " for determining the royalties owing plain44
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tiffs and were "in accordance with the accounting methods employed by the parties prior to 1965". (R. 103)
We concede that this would be a necessary finding to
support a judgment for plaintiffs. However, it may
not stand on this record.
At trial, counsel for plaintiffs posed a question to
Mr. Caldwell to elicit testimony that would support
this finding. However, the question was withdrawn and
not answered by the witness. (Tr. 73-74)
Hence, there is no evidence of record whatever to
support this finding. On the contrary, defendant offered to call Mr, Fred Oliver to testify that plaintiffs'
accounting was not in conformance with either sound
accounting principles or with the accounting methods
used by the parties prior to 1965. (Tr. 116) The Court
erroneously rejected this testimony upon the ground
that it is irrelevant.
In summary, the only evidence offered below demonstrates that the finding is erroneous. It should be set
aside and the Judgment should be reversed.
P O I N T IV
EACH OF T H E FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF L A W E N T E R E D BY
T H E COURT B E L O W IS E R R O N E O U S AS A
MATTER OF L A W AND M U S T . BE SET
ASIDE.
We will not duplicate under this heading our vari45
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ous arguments above. However, we submit that each of
the Findings of Fact of the Court below is unsupported
by any competent evidence and is contrary to evidence
properly proffered by defendant and erroneously rejected by thetrial Judge. W e further submit that each
of the Conclusions of Law is erroneous as a matter of
law and that the Judgment entered thereon must be
reversed.
POINT V
T H E J U D G M E N T W H I C H I S T H E SUBJECT OF T H I S APPEAL, I F SUSTAINED BY
T H I S COURT, W O U L D R E S U L T I N V I O L A T I O N O F D E F E N D A N T ' S R I G H T S TO D U E
PROCESS AS P R O T E C T E D BY B O T H S T A T E
AND F E D E R A L CONSTITUTIONS.
For the numerous reasons stated above, this Court
should never reach this argument. However, we invite
the attention of this Court to the fact that the Judgment
below, if affirmed, would violate both procedural and
substantive due process as protected by both State and
Federal Constitutions.
First, the Court below arbitrarily rejected all of
the evidence proffered by defendant, all of which was
relevant and admissible. This was an effective denial
to be heard and to present evidence, each of which was
violative of procedural due process. In Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Crippen, 224 F.2d 565 (5th
Cir. 1955), the court held that the trial court's refusal
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to allow appellants to introduce any evidence in support of their claims denied them a right to a hearing,
which was a denial of due process. The court stated in
this connection at page 566:
The right to be heard on their claims was a constitutional right and the denial of that right to
them was a denial of due process which is never
harmless error. [Citations omitted]
In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 23 L.Ed. 2d
404, 89 S.Ct. 1843 (1969), Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, stated the
applicable rule where a party is deprived of his right
to present evidence as follows (23 L.Ed. 2d at 421):
The right to present evidence is, of course, essential to the fair hearing required by the due process clause. See e.g., Morgan v. United States,
supra, at 18, 82 L.Ed, at 1132; Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
349, 368-69, 80 L.Ed. 1209? 1223, 1224, 56 S.Ct.
797 (1936).
Second, affirmance of the Judgment below would
also result in the taking of valuable property interests
of defendant without due process of law. It is clear, as
stated in Forde L. Johnson Oil Co. v. H. F. Johnson
Oil Co., 372 P.2d 135, 137 (Ida. 1962) by the Idaho
Supreme Court, that
~
The right to make contracts is both a liberty and
a right, and is within the protection of the guarantee against the taking of liberty or property
without due process . . .
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Defendant here has possessed a valuable contract
right in the form of the Fifty-Year Lease Agreement
for nearly thirty years. As noted by Judge Henroid in
the prior opinion of this Court, a "formula" had been
followed by the parties in interpreting the provisions of
that lease for "about a quarter century." The Judgment appealed from makes a radical and arbitrary departure from that "formula." The result robs defendant
of its bargain, and takes and confiscates its property,
all without due process.
In the landmark case of Chicago, Burlington <§
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
41 L.Ed. 979, 985 (1897), Mr. Justice Harlan noted
that rights secured by the 14th Amendment are protected against acts of "all instrumentalities of the state,"
including its "judicial authorities." H e then stated:
The mere form of the proceeding instituted
against the owner even if he be admitted to defend cannot convert the process used into due
process of law, if the necessary result would be
to deprive him of his property without just compensation.
We submit that the necessary result of affirming
the Judgment below with its wholly arbitrary and critical impact upon defendant would be to deprive it of
its clear and long standing contract rights without due
process.
It follows that the Judgment must be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For each of the numerous reasons stated above, it
is clear that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment entered by the Court below are erroneous
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law and cannot
stand. W e urge this Court to reverse the same.
Respectfully submitted,
K E I T H E. T A Y L O R
of and for
PARSONS, B E H L E & LATIMER
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411J
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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APPENDIX

Defendant sets forth below some of the specific admissions of Mr. Grant Caldwell, plaintiffs' accounting
and only witness, disclosing the lack of foundation in
his testimony. Also, some of the specific offers of evidence made by defendant are enumerated, independently showing that Mr. Caldwell's testimony is lacking in
foundation.
1. Mr. Caldwell incorrectly assumed that the profit
margins of the Sigurd plant for the years 1962-63 would
have remained the same for the years 1971-73, taking
into account inconsequential adjustments. (Tr. 77).
In contravention of this assumption, defendant offered
evidence that profit margins would be different because
(a) the cost of production had increased (Tr. 103-104)
and (b) the marketing price of gypsum board had not
risen commensurately due in part to the rules and regulations of the Federal Government imposing the price
freeze of 1971-73. (Tr. 100-101). Specifically, defendant offered proof that profit margins did not remain
constant over the years but in fact that the profit margins narrowed subsequent to 1962-64. (Tr. 104).
2. Mr. Caldwell's assumptions did not take into
consideration the actual cost increase per unit of gypsum wallboard betwreen the years 1963 through 1964,
on the one hand, and the years 1971 through 1973, on
the other; in fact, he assumed that per unit costs re-
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mained the same. (Tr. 89-90) However, defendant made
an offer of proof that the cost of production at the
sigurd plant increased by $3,00 per 1,000 square feet
between the period 1962-64 and 1971-73. This increase
would have resulted in a profit decline of $400,000 per
year and a decline of over $28,000 per year royalties
owing plaintiffs. (Tr. 103-104)
3. Mr, Caldwell's assumptions did not take into
consideration the Federally imposed rules and regulations limiting the price at which gypsum wallboard
could be sold between the years 1971 and 1973. Mr.
Caldwell stated he failed to do so because he did not
believe that the price freeze had any substantial effect
upon the price at which wallboard produced at the Sigurd plant could be sold between the years 1971 to 1973.
(Tr. 90). In direct contravention of this testimony, defendant offered proof that the price freeze did in fact
affect and limit the price at which gypsum wallboard
could be sold by the defendant. (Tr. 100-102)
4. Mr. Caldwell chose as his base period, 1962
through 1964, the years of the highest profit margins
on the sale of gypsum products he could find from the
defendant's records he examined. (Tr. 78). Moreover,
defendant proffered evidence that Mr. Caldwell's base
period was the most profitable period in the entire history of the Sigurd plant. (Tr. 105)
5. Mr. Caldwell erroneously assujned that the Sigurd plant operated at a level of production for the ye^rs
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1971 through 1973 the same as that for the years 1965
through 1967. (Tr. 80). The truth is, and defendant
offered evidence of the same at page 105 of the transcript, that the years 1965-1967 were the years of highest production in the history of the Sigurd plant.
6. Mr. Caldwell used as his base the marketing
area in the Eastern United States, as opposed to that
in the Western States where the Sigurd products are
actually marketed, because he erroneously assumed that
the Lovell and Acme plants of Georgia-Pacific had
artificially reduced the market price in the West. (Tr.
83-85, 88) In direct contravention, defendant proffered
evidence that the Acme plant did not ship any gypsum
products into the Sigurd marketing area during the
years 1971-73. (Tr. 102-103) Moreover, Mr. Caldwell
made his assumptions even though he performed no marketing or economic studies to determine the actual cause
for the price decline in the Sigurd market for the years
1971 through 1973. (Tr. 85-86). In further contravention of Mr. Caldwell's testimony, defendant proffered
testimony of Mr. Glenn E . Wilson, Vice-President of
Georgia-Pacific Corporation in charge of gypsum operations, that Mr. Caldwell's assumption was false, and
that in fact defendant's market share in the West in the
years 1971 to 1973 was much less than the market share
in the United States generally and in the Eastern markets in particular. (Tr. 103). Additionally, defendant
offered proof that Mr. Caldwell's assumption, that the
Sigurd plant's market area, the Western United States,
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behaved the same as the market area in the rest of the
United States, is incorrect. Mr. Wilson would have
testified that this is not true, and that in fact the two
markets have behaved quite differently. (Tr. 104).
7. Significantly, Mr. Caldwell made his assumptions though he is not an expert in marketing gypsum
products and though he is not an expert in the economics
of the gypsum industry as applied to the Sigurd plant.
Mr. Caldwell acknowledged that his expertise was limited to accounting. (Tr. 77) Defendant, on the other
hand, was prepared to introduce the testimony of individuals having expertise in the economics and marketing
of gypsum products. (Tr. 107-108).
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